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
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# HISTORY

1 January - 31 March 1984

Vol. 2 Supporting Documents

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
 HEADQUARTERS MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND  
 SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225

HO

01 FEB 1984

REPLY TO: DOOAS (Capt Raney, 4127)  
 ACTION OF:

SUBJECT: Exercise AUTUMN FORGE 83--Final After Action Report

See Distribution

1. The subject exercise report has been reviewed by the appropriate MAC staff functional areas. The final report includes the problems, discussions, and recommendations contained in the COMALF and 21 AF/DO reports with a Headquarters MAC action/position and status on each.

2. As we strive to improve the MAC system, we appreciate the efforts of all who assist in the planning, execution, and follow-up on each exercise.

*Richard J. Spurgeon*

RICHARD J. SPURGEON, MAJ Gen, USAF

1 Atch  
 AUTUMN FORGE 83--After Action Report, Items 01-13

cc: CINCMAC/HO  
 HQ AFISC/DAP  
 HQ MAC/AOS/EDC (5)  
 HQ MAC/DEHS/DCCO/DOC/  
 DOOMA/DOOX/DPX/LGX/TRX

DISTRIBUTION

21 AF/DO	435 TAW/DOX	314 TAW/DOX
22 AF/DO	436 MAW/DOX	463 TAW/DOX
23 AF/DO	<u>437 MAW/CV</u>	317 TAW/CV
322 ALD/DOX	437 MAW/DOX	374 TAW/DOX
834 ALD/DOX	62 MAW/DOX	616 MAG/DOX
USAFALCENT/CV	62 MAW/SEF	Det 1, 1701 MOBSS/CC
438 MAW/DOX	60 MAW/DOX	Det 1, 1702 MOBSS/CC
317 TAW/DOX	63 MAW/DOX	

WG COMMAND	
CC	
CV	
CCE	
CVE	
CY TO	ACT/ENFO

AUTUMN FORGE 83--AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPR: HQ MAC/DOOXE  
30 JAN 84

TITLES  
ALPHABETICAL LISTING BY OPR

AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION

ii

AUTUMN FORGE 83 WAS AN UMBRELLA TITLE THAT INCLUDED EXERCISES REFORGER, COLD FIRE, CRESTED CAP, DISPLAY DETERMINATION, AND OKSBOEL. THE DEPLOYMENT PHASE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN 9 AUG AND 27 SEP 83. DEPLOYMENT REQUIRED ONE C-130, ONE C-5, 25 COMMERCIAL, AND 156 C-141 MISSIONS, INCLUDING A FIVE-SHIP INTERCONTINENTAL C-141 AIRDROP ON 19 SEP. REDEPLOYMENT (16 SEP-15 NOV) REQUIRED ONE C-130, ONE C-5, 33 COMMERCIAL, AND 135 C-141 MISSIONS.

EXPLANATION OF TERMS--AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. After action reports have been automated to expedite handling and follow-up action. The report consists of a sequenced listing of titles by OPR (OCR's are only listed in the report itself), other convenient title listings and after action report items.

2. The following codes apply to title listings:

a. HQ MAC OPR for response/corrective action/follow-up.

b. After action item number.

c. After action item title.

d. Classification of item.

e. Status of corrective action--open ("O" - will be followed in MAC Remedial Action Program) or closed ("C" - item completed or inappropriate for HQ MAC action; will not be followed in MAC RAP).

f. Whether the corrective action is internal to MAC(I) or requires external action or assistance (E).

3. The format for each item is consistent. Abbreviations indicate paragraph content of Title (T), Problem (P), Discussion (D), Recommendation (R), Action (A), Status (S), and action OPR (O). Subsequent entries on the OPR line are OCR's.

AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION

DEH 001	SUPPLEMENTS TO MEALS TASKING MESSAGE	U C I
DOO 002	MISSION ALLOCATION BETWEEN MAC AFS	U C I
DOO 003	JCS MILESTONES	U C I
DOO 004	SILENT ATC PROCEDURES	U O I
DOO 005	PPRS FOR JCS EXERCISES	U C I
DOO 006	IDENTIFICATION OF UNITS PLANNED TO MOVE ON EACH MISSION	U C I
DOO 009	COMMAND AND CONTROL OF C-130 ASSETS INBOUND TO THE THEATER	U C I
DOO 010	STRATEGIC AIRFLOW DISSEMINATION	U C I
DOX 007	AUGMENTATION MANNING	U O I
DOX 008	AUGMENTATION PERSONNEL	U C I
DPX 012	RECEPTION PLANNING	U C I
DPX 013	AUGMENTATION MANNING	U C I
TRX 011	ALOC PROCEDURES	U O I



VTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION

1

SUPPLEMENTS TO MEALS TASKING MESSAGE

001 T

INFLIGHT MEAL SUPPLEMENTS WERE NOT PUBLISHED BY HQ MAC/DEHS.

001 P

INITIAL MEALS DEPLOYMENT TASKING MESSAGE WAS PUBLISHED ON 8 JUL 83 BASED ON A DRAFT FLOW PLAN THAT HAD INCOMPLETE AND INACCURATE PASSENGER INFORMATION. FINAL DEPLOYMENT MEALS TASKING WAS PUBLISHED BY MAC/DEH ON 9 AUG 83. NUMEROUS PASSENGER CHANGES WERE SUBSEQUENTLY MADE BY III CORPS. HQ 21AF/DOX SPENT SEVERAL WORK HOURS PUBLISHING REVISED MEALS TASKING VIA SUPPLE-

001 D

MENT MESSAGE. TELEPHONIC COORDINATION WITH HQ MAC/DEHS INDICATED THEIR PREFERENCE FOR US TO HANDLE CHANGE NOTIFICATION ON MEALS. REDEPLOYMENT MEALS TASKING WAS PUBLISHED ON 7 SEP 83 AND NO REVISIONS WERE SENT OUT. MOST REDEPLOYMENT MISSIONS WERE OPERATED FROM FORMAL MAC AERIAL PORTS. SINCE MEALS WERE READILY AVAILABLE, THERE WAS ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY TO MEET CHANGES AT THE AERIAL PORT LEVEL.

001 D

HQ MAC/DEHS IMMEDIATELY PUBLISH SUPPLEMENTS TO THE MEALS TASKING MESSAGE WHEN HQ MAC/DOOX VALIDATES CHANGES TO THE ORIGINAL FLOW PLAN.

001 R

HQ MAC/DEHS IS AT THE DISPOSAL OF HQ MAC/DOOX TO PROVIDE ANY SUPPORT NECESSARY. WHEN AND IF A VALIDATED CHANGE TO THE ORIGINAL FLOW PLAN IS PROVIDED, MAC/DEHS WOULD IMMEDIATELY PUBLISH SUPPLEMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL MEAL TASKING MESSAGE.

001 A

CLOSED.

001 S

OPR: HQ MAC/DEHS

001 O

MISSION ALLOCATION BETWEEN MAC AFS

002 T

AIRCRAFT/AIRCREW ALLOCATIONS BETWEEN MAC AFS WERE NOT PROJECTED ACCURATELY.

002 P

THE FLYING HOURS WERE ESSENTIALLY BALANCED BETWEEN MAC AFS WHEN 21AF/DOX RECEIVED THE AIRLIFT FLOW FROM HQ MAC/DOOX. AFTER RECEIVING SEVERAL HIGH-PRIORITY SAAMS, 21AF/DOOMA NOTIFIED 21AF/DOXC THAT THE FIRST 7 DAYS OF OCT REDEPLOYMENT WERE UNMANAGEABLE DUE TO LACK OF AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. THE LAST-MINUTE RECOVERY EFFORTS CAUSED TURBULENCE THROUGHOUT THE MAC SYSTEM.

002 D

HQ MAC/DOO FORECAST REALISTIC REQUIREMENTS EARLY AND DURING HEAVY COMMITMENT ASSIGN MISSIONS TO THE MAC AFS BASED ON SORTIE GENERATION WORKLOAD VICE FLYING HOUR BALANCE.

002 R

1. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF OCT, 21AF WAS TASKED AND ACTUALLY FLEW A SMALLER PERCENT OF THEIR POSSESSED AIRCRAFT THAN 22AF. WHILE 21AF ACTUALLY FLEW 8% MORE OF THEIR POSSESSED AIRCRAFT THAN PLANNED, 22AF OPERATED 11% GREATER THAN PLANNED. THE EXERCISE STAGE CREW TASKING IS COORDINATED BETWEEN THE CONTROLLING AF EXERCISE DIRECTOR AND THE TWO NAF AIRLIFT DIRECTORS

002 A

TO THEIR SATISFACTION.

002 A

2. THE TURBULENCE CAUSED THROUGHOUT THE MAC SYSTEM THE FIRST WEEK OF OCT WAS CAUSED BY SHORT-NOTICE, HIGH-PRIORITY CONTINGENCY SAAMS.

3. HQ MAC/DOOM WILL CONTINUE TO DISTRIBUTE THE AIRCRAFT/AIRCREW WORKLOAD AS EQUITABLY AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE NAFs.

CLOSED.

002 S

OPR: HQ MAC/DOOMA  
OCR: HQ MAC/DOOX

002 O

JCS MILESTONES

003 T

JCS MILESTONE DEADLINES WERE NOT REALISTICALLY ESTABLISHED.

003 P

THE MILESTONES FOR AUTUMN FORGE 83 WERE BASED ON THE START OF OKSBOEL DEPLOYMENT IN AUG, WHILE THE MAIN REFORGER DEPLOYMENT WAS SCHEDULED FOR SEP. AS A RESULT, MUCH OF THE INFORMATION FOR REFORGER REQUIRED TO MEET THE MILESTONES WAS NOT AVAILABLE.

003 D

HQ MAC PUBLISH MILESTONES FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL EXERCISE IN A SERIES OF COMBINED EXERCISES.

003 R

AUTUMN FORGE 83 WAS COMPOSED OF REFORGER, CRESTED CAP, COLD FIRE, DISPLAY DETERMINATION, AND OKSBOEL EXERCISES. MAC MILESTONES WERE BASED ON THE MILESTONES DEVELOPED BY THE SPONSORING COMMAND, USEUCOM, FOR REFORGER (THE LARGEST OF THE AUTUMN FORGE EXERCISES) AND APPROVED BY THE PARTICIPATING COMMANDS, INCLUDING MAC. THE 1 AUG MILESTONE REFERENCE DATE (THE FIRST

003 A

DAY OF THE MONTH IN WHICH DEPLOYMENT BEGAN) ESTABLISHED BY USEUCOM WAS USED BY MAC FOR ALL OF THE AUTUMN FORGE EXERCISES SINCE ONLY ONE OPERATION ORDER AND ONE AIRFLOW WAS PUBLISHED. ALL MILESTONES WERE REVIEWED TO INSURE THEY COULD BE REALISTICALLY ACCOMPLISHED. ALL USEUCOM AND HQ MAC MILESTONES WERE MET EXCEPT FOR COLD FIRE AIRLIFT REQUESTS, AND THE INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE FOR 21AF

003 A

UNITS TO MEET THEIR MILESTONES. THE HQ MAC/DOO CONCEPT/TASKING MESSAGE FOR AUTUMN FORGE TASKED THE CONTROLLING MAC AF, 21AF, TO MEET MILESTONES FOR ALCC AND ALCE MANPOWER/MATERIEL PACKAGES, SITE SURVEYS AND AIRLIFT REQUESTS FOR MISSION SUPPORT AND AUGMENTATION MISSIONS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP ONE AIRFLOW AND ONE OPOD FOR AUTUMN FORGE IN ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE/REDUCE AIRCRAFT AND

003 A

AIRCREW COMMITMENTS. MILESTONES WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN A LOGICAL AND REALISTIC TIME FRAME TO ALLOW THE EXERCISE PLANNING TO PROCEED IN A TIMELY MANNER.

003 A

AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION

3

CLOSED.

003 S

OPR: HQ MAC/DOOX

003 O

SILENT ATC PROCEDURES

004 T

SILENT CROSSING PROCEDURES IN CANADIAN AIRSPACE.

004 P

THE 21AF WAS REQUIRED TO PUBLISH THE PROCEDURE AND EXECUTE THE "SILENT CROSSING" DURING AUTUMN FORGE 83 DEPLOYMENT; HOWEVER, 21AF WAS NOT INVITED TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE COORDINATION CONFERENCES. THE PROCEDURES PUBLISHED BY 21AF/DOXC REFLECTED THE CONCEPTS THEY UNDERSTOOD HAD BEEN AGREED TO BY ALL CONCERNED CONTROLLING AGENCIES. IN FACT, ONLY THE EUROPEAN

004 D

AGENCIES HAD FULLY AGREED TO THE PROCEDURES, WHILE THE CANADIAN AGENCIES WERE EXPECTING ENCODED POSITION REPORTS. THIS RESULTED (AFTER STARTEX) IN COORDINATING AND PUBLISHING AN ALTITUDE RESERVATION (ALTRV) WITH A 1-HOUR APPROVAL IS VOID FOR AIRCRAFT NOT AIRBORNE (AVANA) TIME. THIS COMPLICATED THE SILENT CROSSING PROCEDURE AND REDUCED THE TRAINING VALUE TO THE MAC SYSTEM.

004 D

THE 21AF REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE INVITED TO ALL CONFERENCES THAT DEAL WITH PROCEDURES 21AF MUST PLAN AND EXECUTE.

004 R

1. THE SILENT CROSSING PROCEDURES USED DURING AUTUMN FORGE 83 WERE BASED ON PROCEDURES DEVELOPED DURING REFORGERS 78, 79, AND 81. THESE PROCEDURES WERE COORDINATED WITH THE AIR RESERVATION UNIT (ARU) IN CANADA, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL AIR RESERVATION FACILITY (EUCARF) AT RHEIN-MAIN AB, AND 21AF/DOX. THE 21AF/DOX WAS REQUESTED TO COMMENT ON THE INITIAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS;

004 A

HOWEVER, NO INPUT WAS RECEIVED.

004 A

2. NO PLANNING CONFERENCES WERE HELD FOR THE SILENT ROUTING. COORDINATION WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY MESSAGE TRAFFIC. THE 21AF/DOX WAS TASKED WITH DEVELOPING THE SPECIFIC PROCEDURES BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS PROVIDED BY HQ MAC. HQ MAC WAS NOT APPRISED OF THE COORDINATION PROBLEMS AT GOOSE BAY AND CONSEQUENTLY COULD NOT

PROVIDE A RESOLUTION. PROCEDURES DEVELOPED BY 21AF AND THE GOOSE BAY ALCE DID NOT PROVIDE OPTIMUM TRAINING FOR AIRCREWS, ALCE PERSONNEL OR ATC AGENCIES FOR SILENT CROSSING OBJECTIVES.

004 A

3. HQ MAC IS PLANNING TO EXERCISE THE SILENT ROUTING PROCEDURES DURING AUTUMN FORGE 84 AND REFORGER 85. GENERAL PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN APPROVED FOR INCORPORATION INTO MACRS 55-2, 55-130,

55-141, AND 55-3, VOL I. COORDINATION WILL BEGIN IN JAN WITH ARU AND EUCARF FOR AUTUMN FORGE 84. INITIAL PLANNING WILL INCLUDE A MEETING AT EUCARF IN LATE APR TO CLARIFY EUROPEAN PROCEDURES. MEETING WITH CANADIAN AGENCIES, IF REQUIRED, WILL BE SCHEDULED FOLLOWING THE EUCARF MEETING.

004 A

OPEN.

004 S

AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION

4

OPR: HQ MAC/DOOX  
OCR: HQ MAC/DCOO

004 O

PPRS FOR JCS EXERCISES

005 T

EXCESSIVE TIME CONSUMED IN OBTAINING PPRS.

005 P

THE PPR SYSTEM ALLOWS LOCAL BASE OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO CONTROL AND HAVE INFORMATION ON FLIGHTS TRANSITING THEIR BASE. FOR UP TO A HANDFUL OF MISSIONS, THIS IS NOT A GREAT TASK FOR SCHEDULERS TO COORDINATE; HOWEVER, WHEN SEVERAL MISSIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR A LARGE-SCALE JCS EXERCISE, THE TASK OF OBTAINING A PPR NUMBER FOR EACH MISSION REQUIRES 2 TO 3 WORKDAYS.

005 D

HQ MAC SHOULD TAKE ACTION TO GET MAC MISSIONS SUPPORTING JCS EXERCISES EXEMPTED FROM NORMAL OPERATING HOUR PPR REQUIREMENTS.

005 R

USE OF AIR BASES FOR AN EXERCISE IS COORDINATED BY THE HQ MAC/DOOX EXERCISE DIRECTOR EARLY IN THE AIRFLOW PLANNING. OPERATING HOUR RESTRICTIONS, MAXIMUM ON GROUND (MOG), FUEL AVAILABILITY AND PPR REQUIREMENTS ARE DISCUSSED AND APPROVAL TO OPERATE INTO THE BASE IS OBTAINED. WAIVERS TO PPR REQUIREMENTS ARE ALSO REQUESTED; HOWEVER, THE BASE MAY STILL WANT TO ISSUE PPR NUMBERS

005 A

ONCE THE SPECIFIC FLOW PLAN IS DEVELOPED. SINCE APPROVAL TO OPERATE INTO THE BASE HAS ALREADY BEEN OBTAINED, GETTING THE SPECIFIC PPR NUMBER SHOULD REQUIRE A SINGLE TELEPHONE CALL. HQ MAC EXERCISE DIRECTORS WILL CONTINUE TO REQUEST WAIVERS TO THE PPR REQUIREMENTS OR A BLANKET PPR FOR THE EXERCISE DURING THE COORDINATION WITH THE AIRFIELD MANAGER; HOWEVER, THE CONTROLLING MAC AF WILL REMAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING THE FINAL CLEARANCE NUMBER, IF REQUIRED.

005 A

CLOSED.

005 S

OPR: HQ MAC/DOOX

005 O

IDENTIFICATION OF UNITS PLANNED TO MOVE ON EACH MISSION

006 T

DIFFICULTY ASSOCIATING UNITS WITH MISSIONS.

006 P

USER IDENTIFICATION IS NORMALLY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION; THEREFORE, HQ MAC USES LUMP NUMBERS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH MISSION. EACH LUMP NUMBER IS ALSO ASSOCIATED WITH ONE OR MORE FORCE REQUIREMENT NUMBERS (FRN). THE FRN IS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH UNIT ON A CLASSIFIED PRINTOUT THAT IS ONLY AVAILABLE AT THE FINAL TRANSPORTATION CONFERENCE. THEREFORE, THREE SEPARATE

006 D

DOCUMENTS MUST BE CONSULTED TO BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE UNIT ON A SPECIFIC MISSION. IF USER PROBLEMS ARISE, ALCES AND AERIAL PORTS NEED TO QUICKLY FIND OUT WHAT UNIT IS RESPONSIBLE. THIS INABILITY TO EASILY IDENTIFY USERS IMPEDES MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

006 D

AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION

5

HQ MAC SHOULD PUBLISH UNIT IDENTIFICATION LISTED AGAINST EACH MISSION NUMBER.

006 R

1. LUMP NUMBERS ALLOW THE SCHEDULING OF FRNS THAT DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A FULL AIRCRAFT LOAD BY COMBINING FRNS WITH LIKE APODS/APOES AND AVAILABLE/LATEST ARRIVAL DATES. HQ MAC PROVIDED A LUMP REPORT TO 21AF WITH THE FRNS IN EACH LUMP; IN ADDITION, THE TIMED PHASED FORCE DEPLOYMENT PLANNING DOCUMENT USED TO BUILD THE AIRFLOW WAS AVAILABLE TO 21AF. AS TELEPHONE

006 A

NUMBERS FOR THE USERS' POINTS OF CONTACT BECAME AVAILABLE, THEY WERE PROVIDED TO 21AF BY HQ MAC, THE ARRED PLANNING AGENT AT FT HOOD, AND FROM FORSCOM.

006 A

2. ON FUTURE AUTUMN FORGE EXERCISES, THE LUMPING PROCESS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE JOINT DEPLOYMENT AGENCY. SPECIFIC UNITS IN EACH LUMP WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE JDA DATA BASE. THE ARRED

PLANNING AGENT WILL PROVIDE POINTS OF CONTACT FOR THE DEPLOYING UNITS AND THE ARMY AIRFIELD DEPARTURE/ARRIVAL GROUP (ADAG) AS SOON AS THEY ARE KNOWN.

006 A

CLOSED.

006 S

OPR: HQ MAC/DOOX

006 O

AUGMENTATION MANNING

007 T

OSC ENTRY CONTROL.

007 P

ENTRY TO THE OSC IS LIMITED TO THOSE PERSONNEL WITH RAMSTEIN LINE BADGES AND APPROPRIATE OPEN NUMBERS; PERSONNEL WITH HOME STATION BADGES, A TOP SECRET CLEARANCE, AND LISTING ON A 322ALD-CERTIFIED ENTRY ROSTER; OR BY ESCORT BY A CERTIFIED ESCORT OFFICER. THE TDY PERSONNEL HAD NUMEROUS PROBLEMS COMPLYING WITH THESE PROCEDURES, INCLUDING A MAJOR LOG-JAM

007 D

AT SHIFT CHANGE, A FEELING OF CONFINEMENT DUE TO 100 PERCENT ESCORT, AND FRUSTRATION WITH "THE SYSTEM."

007 D

TAKE STEPS TO INSURE ALL PERSONNEL SCHEDULED TO AUGMENT THE COMALF HAVE TOP SECRET CLEARANCES. ADDITIONALLY, FOR EXERCISES, INSURE ALL AUGMENTEES ARE PREBRIEFED ON ENTRY CONTROL PROCEDURES AND INFORM 322ALD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE SO THAT ENTRY ROSTERS CAN BE DEVELOPED PRIOR TO PERSONNEL ARRIVAL.

007 R

1. THE AUGMENTATION FOR THE COMALF AND ALCC STAFFS FOR AUTUMN FORGE IS BASED ON A DEPLOYMENT MANNING DOCUMENT (DMD) DEVELOPED BY 21AF AND THE 322ALD AND VALIDATED BY HQ MAC. THE DMD CONTAINS AFSC AND SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS. MAC UNITS ARE THEN LEVIED TO FILL THE DMD BY SPECIFIC LINE NUMBER. HQ MAC DID NOT RECEIVE THE PROPOSED DMD FROM 21AF UNTIL 24 AUG, 9 WEEKS

007 A

AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION

6

007 A  
AFTER THE 13 JUN SUSPENSE TASKED IN THE HQ MAC/DOO CONCEPT/TASKING MESSAGE PUBLISHED ON 12 MAY. CONSEQUENTLY, THE IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS TO FILL THE LINE NUMBERS WAS ALSO DELAYED. LEVIED UNITS WERE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE 21AF AND THE 322ALD THE AUGMENTEES' NAMES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER THAT ENTRY ROSTERS COULD BE DEVELOPED.

007 A  
2. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE NAMES OF PARTICIPATING AUGMENTEES TO THE 322ALD FOR CONTROL ROSTERS, THE DMD MUST BE RECEIVED AT HQ MAC IN A TIMELY MANNER.

3. THE 322ALD SHOULD PROVIDE AN IN-BRIEFING TO ALL AUGMENTEES ON THEIR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO INCLUDE ENTRY CONTROL PROCEDURES.

007 S  
OPEN.

007 O  
OPR: 21AF/DOX  
OCR: HQ MAC/DOOX

008 T  
AUGMENTATION PERSONNEL.

008 P  
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.

008 D  
NUMEROUS INDIVIDUALS COMMENTED ON SEVERAL ASPECTS OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT. THESE RANGED FROM LACK OF A FIRST SERGEANT, TO SHORT NOTIFICATION, TO INCORRECT/MISSING REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS, TO LACK OF A MANPOWER DOCUMENT WITH LINE NUMBERS FOR ACCOUNTING PURPOSES. THESE PROBLEMS WERE NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEGRADE THE OVERALL OPERATION, BUT WERE IRRITATING ENOUGH SO THAT SEVERAL COMMENTS CONCLUDED WITH "NEVER AGAIN."

008 R  
REVIEW MANPOWER PROPOSALS FOR ADEQUATE "PEOPLE" STAFFING. PUBLISH A FULL DMD WITH NAMES, LINE NUMBERS, AND POSITIONS, AND ATTEMPT TO FORECAST REQUIREMENTS SO THAT MINIMUM SHORT-NOTICE TASKING IS INVOLVED. PROVIDE UPDATE INFORMATION INCLUDING TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS FOR MID-TOUR SWAPS.

008 A  
1. THE MANPOWER PROPOSALS FOR THE COMALF ALCC AND AIDs WERE DEVELOPED BY 21AF/DOX AS WERE THE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR EACH LOCATION. AS CONTROLLING AIR FORCE, THEY WERE TASKED TO SUBMIT THESE REQUIREMENTS BY 1 JUL 83. REQUIREMENTS WERE FORWARDED BY 21AF/DOXL ON 24 AUG 83 (241800Z AUG 83). OTHER IN-THEATER AUGMENTATION FORCES WERE DEVELOPED AND SOURCED THROUGH

008 A  
USAFE/DOX AND THE 322ALD. SUBSEQUENTLY, USAFE/DPXX BUILT THE IN-THEATER AUGMENTATION INTO THEIR DMD. THE LACK OF MANPOWER DOCUMENTATION IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE LATE/INCOMPLETE SUBMISSION FROM 21AF/DOXL.

2. THE RECOMMENDATION TO PUBLISH A FULL DMD WITH NAMES, LINE NUMBERS, AND POSITIONS IS NOT PRACTICAL. CHANGES ARE TOO NUMEROUS

008 A  
TO MAKE PUBLICATION OF AN ACCURATE DOCUMENT FEASIBLE, THE PROCEDURES IN MACR 28-2 ARE SUFFICIENT TO INSURE THE TIMELY NOTIFICATION TO ALL PARTICIPANTS. RECOMMEND COMALF/DP BE ADDED TO THE STAFF.

AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION

7

CLOSED.

OPR: 21AF/DOX  
OCR: HQ MAC/DPX

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF C-130 ASSETS INBOUND TO THE THEATER

C-130S EN ROUTE TO THE THEATER FROM OUTSIDE (LPLA AND CYR) WOULD NOT SHOW UP IN THE TIMS DATA BASE, COMPLICATING FLIGHT FOLLOWING.

ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, C-130S DEPARTED LPLA OR CYR FOR EUROPEAN BASES. IN MOST CASES, A DEPARTURE MESSAGE WOULD BE RECEIVED BY 322ALD AND RELAYED TO CALD (SOMETIMES VERY LATE, 6 HOURS) WITH NEXT DESTINATION, ETC. CALD WOULD HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THESE MISSIONS (ITINERARY, AUTH GND TIMES, ETC.). THIS CAUSED GYRATIONS THRU COMALF TO 21AF FOR INFO. POSITIVE TRANSFER OF

COMMAND AND CONTROL FROM 21AF TO THE CALD WAS LACKING. BEFORE CALD CAN EFFECTIVELY PERFORM COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS, IT MUST KNOW MSN ITINERARY, ETC.

CALD ASSUME COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS FOR INBOUND C-130S BEGINNING AT 10W, AS IS CURRENTLY DONE BY 322ALD; THAT CALD BE FURNISHED COMPLETE SETUP INFORMATION BY COMALF/21AF ON ALL C-130S INBOUND FROM OUTSIDE THE THEATER BEFORE THEY DEPART THE LAST STATION PRIOR TO ENTERING THE THEATER. THESE MISSIONS SHOULD BE ENTERED INTO TIMS, JUST LIKE THE OTHERS. CALD SHOULD

BE GIVEN COMPLETE DIVERSION AND REROUTE AUTHORITY OVER THESE AIRCRAFT JUST AS IT HAS ON THE INTRATHEATER RESOURCES.

1. THE PROBLEMS ADDRESSED HERF RESULT FROM INCOMPLETE DISTRIBUTION OF SCHEDULING INFORMATION. THE NEEDS THAT ARE IDENTIFIED WILL BE MET IF THE SCHEDULING ACTIVITY PROVIDES COMPLETE SCHEDULE INFORMATION (AIMS, FRAGORD, ETC.) TO ALL COMMAND AND CONTROL AGENCIES THAT WILL BE INVOLVED IN THE EXECUTION OF THAT SCHEDULE.

2. CONCERNING THE SUGGESTION THAT CALD BE GIVEN COMPLETE DIVERSION AND REROUTE AUTHORITY OVER AIRCRAFT, THIS AUTHORITY RESTS SOLELY WITH THE AGENCY EXERCISING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER THE AIRCRAFT IN QUESTION AS SPECIFIED IN THE APPROPRIATE OPORD.

CLOSED.

OPR: HQ MAC/DOOX  
OCR: HQ MAC/DOC

STRATEGIC AIRFLOW DISSEMINATION

008 S

008 O

009 T

009 P

009 D

009 D

009 R

009 R

009 A

009 A

009 S

009 O

010 T

AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION

8

ALLIED NATIONS HAD TOO MANY CHANGES.

010 P

CONFUSION DEVELOPED AT SOME ALLIED AIRPORTS WHEN CONFRONTED WITH NUMEROUS VERSIONS AT THE AIRFLOW FROM MANY DIFFERENT SOURCES, E.G., FLOGEN, 21AF, THE OPERATING WING FOR SAAMS.

010 D

ATTEMPT TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF VERSIONS OF THE AIRFLOW AND, IF FEASIBLE, DESIGNATE ONE AGENCY TO PROVIDE DATA TO THE HOST NATIONS.

010 R

THE DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT AIRFLOWS FOR JCS EXERCISES ARE PUBLISHED BY HQ MAC/DOOX THROUGH THE FLOGEN COMPUTER AUTODIN INTERFACE. ONCE THE AIRFLOW IS TURNED OVER TO THE CONTROLLING MAC AF FOR EXECUTION, SUPPORT MISSIONS AND ANY CHANGES TO THE FLOW ARE PUBLISHED BY A MAC AF SUPPLEMENT TO THE FLOGEN MESSAGE. EVERY ATTEMPT IS MADE TO KEEP CHANGES TO A MINIMUM. IF THE NUMBER

010 A

OF CHANGES BECOMES TOO LARGE, A NEW MASTER AIRFLOW IS PUBLISHED THROUGH THE FLOGEN COMPUTER. HQ MAC WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH OUR USERS TO KEEP LAST-MINUTE CHANGES TO A MINIMUM.

010 A

CLOSED.

010 S

OPR: HQ MAC/DOOX

010 O

ALOC PROCEDURES

011 T

THERE IS NO PROCEDURE TO MOVE ALOC CARGO FROM A STRATEGIC APOD TO THE REQUESTING CORPS BY AIR.

011 P

CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR ALOC HAVE CARGO SHIPPED TO EITHER OF TWO APODS WHERE IT IS PROCESSED THROUGH THE PORT FOR FINAL MOVEMENT TO THE CORPS BY SURFACE. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A PROCEDURE TO KEEP THE CARGO IN THE AIRLIFT SYSTEM UNTIL DELIVERED TO THE CORPS REAR BY C-130. THIS BECOMES VITAL IF THE CARGO IS STOPPED SHORT OF ITS ORIGINAL APOD, I.E., AT MILDENHALL INSTEAD OF RAMSTEIN.

011 D

MAC AND 322ALD COORDINATE WITH ARMY SHIPPERS AND RECEIVERS BOTH IN EUROPE AND CONUS TO DEVELOP PROCEDURES TO INSURE TIMELY DELIVERY OF ALOC CARGO.

011 R

PROBLEM HAS BEEN REFERRED TO 21AF/TRKO FOR ACTION. STILL PENDING RESOLUTION.

011 A

OPEN.

011 S

OPR: HQ MAC/TRX  
OCR: HQ MAC/LGX

011 O

RECEPTION PLANNING

012 T



AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION

9

LACK OF DETAILED INFORMATION FROM CONUS PRECLUDED RESPONSIVE RECEPTION ACTIVITIES.

012 P

ALTHOUGH MANPOWER PLANNING WAS INITIATED IN LATE MAY BY 322ALD, WE WERE NOT PROVIDED RELIABLE PERSONNEL DATA AS LATE AS THE DAY OF DEPARTURE FROM CONUS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT 80 PEOPLE ON THE EXERCISE MISSION AND ONLY RECEIVED ABOUT 40 PEOPLE. THIS THREW OUR RECEPTION PROGRAM INTO COMPLETE TURMOIL. AS NOTED IN EARLIER ITEMS, TIMELY, RELIABLE, COMPLETE INFORMATION IS NEEDED TO MANAGE AN AUGMENTATION PROGRAM.

012 D

INVOLVE THE PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS AT ALL LEVELS IN THE DEVELOPMENT, SOURCING, AND MANAGEMENT OF AN AUGMENTATION PACKAGE. PROVIDE DATA TO THE RECEIVING STATION(S) NLT 45 DAYS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL SO ADEQUATE COORDINATION CAN BE PERFORMED IN AREAS OF TRANSPORTATION, BILLETING, TRAINING, AND RECEPTION.

012 R

PERSONNEL IS INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT, SOURCING, AND MANAGEMENT OF AUGMENTATION PACKAGES AND DESIGNATES THE DATE THAT EACH INDIVIDUAL MUST REPORT TO THE EMPLOYMENT SITE. THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN THE DMD AND TPDF. TRANSPORTATION ARRANGES AIRLIFT BASED UPON KNOWN AIRCRAFT SCHEDULES. PERSONNEL HAS NO CONTROL OVER AIRFLOW CHANGES, AIRCRAFT DELAYS, OR SEAT AVAILABILITY.

012 A

CLOSED.

012 S

OPR: HQ MAC/DPX

012 O

AUGMENTATION MANNING

013 T

AUGMENTEES IN SOME CASES WERE UNQUALIFIED FOR THE POSITION TO WHICH THEY WERE ASSIGNED.

013 P

A LACK OF QUALITY CONTROL IN THE SELECTION OF AUGMENTEES ALLOWED POSITIONS TO BE FILLED BY UNQUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS. A CASE IN POINT WAS THE INDIVIDUAL SELECTED AS COMALF/ADO, HE WAS A LINE NAVIGATOR WITH NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN A DO MANAGEMENT POSITION. THE SELECTION OF SQUADRON CREW MEMBERS FOR STAFF TACTICS AND PLANS ROLES ALSO LED TO PROBLEMS IN TIMELY PROCESSING AND COORDINATION OF PLANNING ITEMS FROM DEPLOYED UNITS TO THE 435TAW FOR MISSION SETUPS.

013 D

DEVELOP BETTER DEFINITION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND DUTIES BY POSITION NUMBER/AFSC, DEVELOP A MEANS OF RELAYING THIS DATA IN THE PERSONNEL TASKING SYSTEM, AND INSURE QUALITY CONTROL IS APPLIED AT THE UNIT LEVEL WHERE INDIVIDUALS ARE SELECTED TO FILL POSITIONS.

013 R

DEFINITION OF REQUIREMENTS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICE WHICH CREATES THE COMALF STRUCTURE. SINCE MACR 28-2 ALLOWS FOR SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN AFSCS 1425 AND 2245, 21AF/DOXL SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SPECIFIC IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMALF REQUIREMENTS. THE REQUIREMENTS SUBMITTED IN THEIR 24 AUG 83 MESSAGE CONTAINED NO SPECIAL EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADO. THEIR MANPOWER

013 A

AUTUMN FORGE 83 AFTER ACTION

10

MESSAGE ON 31 AUG 83 DID NOT EVEN CONTAIN THAT POSITION AT ALL.  
IN ADDITION, 21AF/DOX SOURCED THIS POSITION TO THE RESERVES  
911 TAW). THIS IS A 21AF INTERNAL ACTION ITEM.

013 A

CLOSED.

013 S

OPR: HQ MAC/DPX  
OCR: HQ MAC/DOOX

013 O

Military Airlift Command units, the annual Reforger exercise means . . .

# Moving the Forces of War

by MSgt. Tom Kuhn, USAFR  
AIRMAN Contributing Staff Writer

Capt. John Brett braced against the chill and the morning rain as he left his dry bunker. A relentless North Sea wind sliced across the openness of Gilze-Rijen, a Dutch fighter base in the southern part of the Netherlands, near the Belgian border.

Capt. Brett, the commander of the airlift control element—"ALCE"—for Military Airlift Command (MAC), headed for the German C-160 *Transall* that had just landed. It would take on a load of U.S. Army jeeps and their drivers.

Reforger '83 was on the upswing as NATO allies mounted a counter attack against a mock invasion of Western Europe. Reforger—return of U.S. forces to Germany—was really many exercises and was, in turn, part of the Autumn Forge war games in Europe.

The forces were divided into a defending army and an aggressor force. Overhead, U.S. Air Force F-4s that had been ferried across the Atlantic behind air refuelers, were providing friendly air cover as part of exercise Crested Cap.

The massive, annual exercise involved 40,000 American, Dutch, Canadian, British, and Canadian mili-



tary members and tons of equipment. Keeping men and machines moving was MAC's responsibility, and people like Capt. Brett were in Europe to help keep the massive airlift on schedule.

Capt. Brett had established his headquarters in a bunker map room at Gilze-Rijen. Rain had fallen for eight straight days. And more was predicted. The woods around the bunker smelled dank, and he was surprised he hadn't come down with a cold.

By the time Capt. Brett reached the parking apron, the props had been

shut down on the C-160—similar to a two-engine version of the C-130 *Hercules*—and Army troopers in ponchos awaited their loading calls. Two Dutch anti-aircraft weapons were dug in about 300 yards away, next to a cornfield. Their presence lent reality to the warlike atmosphere.

"The rain makes it tough for everyone," Capt. Brett said, "but this is really the kind of stuff we'd have to fight in, anyway, if war broke out. I think the generals and field commanders actually prefer this kind of weather; it lends more realism to the exercise."


The captain was involved in the 1982 Reforger, also. He is assigned to the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing at Rhein-Main AB, near Frankfurt. "Exercise veterans like me are refining what we've done before—going through procedures we'd have to follow if this were for real."

The C-160 was loaded and taxiing. A Canadian Air Force C-130 had dropped beneath the overcast and was battling winds as it lined up on the Gilze-Rijen runway. About 30 minutes behind, a North Carolina Air National Guard C-130 was also on its way. A plane would come and go every 30 minutes all day long, and their schedules would be dutifully reported by Capt. Brett over a crypto scrambler in his bunker office.

"People who haven't taken part in Reforger before are here to learn. That's how a corporate memory is developed," he said. When he had left Frankfurt two weeks earlier for the start of Reforger, the September days had been warm and mild. Since then, all of Europe, it seemed, had become a bog. He wriggled inside his camouflage field jacket. "I'd rather have the sunshine," he said.

Reforger had begun as a strategic airlift. In eight days of radio-silent flying across the Atlantic, Military Airlift Command planes had delivered 17,000 U.S. Army troops from U.S. bases to airfields in the Netherlands and Germany. The forces swelled battalions permanently garrisoned in Europe.

The war games were the biggest North Atlantic Treaty Alliance show of force of the year—a test of military readiness in the context of NATO's



**CLOCKWISE (from top):** An A-10 *Thunderbolt II* waits to taxi as another prepares to land. "First there" is the promise of a combat control team member. The international honor guard presents the colors during ceremonies. **OPPOSITE PAGE:** Ground crews race toward an A-10 to prepare it for another sortie. A C-141B from the 63rd MAW at Norton AFB, Calif., taxis at Luxembourg Airport.

deterrent mission. More than 250 of the U.S. reinforcements parachuted from air-refueled C-141B's that returned to the United States without landing. Other Army members were transported to Europe on commercial airliners.

Capt. Brett was one of a half-dozen ALCE members who had prepared the way for their arrival. He had started at Schiphol Airport, outside Amsterdam, where civil security had been tighter than usual because of anti-military demonstrations.

From the fogged window of his terminal building headquarters at Schiphol he had watched Army drivers deplane for a bus ride to Rotterdam to meet heavy equipment arriving from the United States by ship.

The aircraft commander, Capt. D.W. Evans of the 86th Military Airlift Squadron, was sheltering beneath the wing of his C-141B as troops filed out the rear cargo door and headed for the Mercedes buses. The underside of the *Starlifter* wing was glazed with frost from the 5½-hour crossing from Goose Bay, Labrador.

"We've been out for two weeks, flying a variety of missions," he said, zipping his jacket higher against the cold. A couple of crewmembers joined him under the wing. They had, he said, been flying one mission after another. "We've flown support for [exercise] Bright Star in Egypt. Tonight we'll be in Mildenhall [England], and that's where we'll learn what our next mission is. We won't be home for another week, at least."

As he talked, Autumn Forge had reached the German border. Allied troops were preparing to throw a pontoon bridge across the Maas River. Armor was massing on the autobahns. Reforger had become tactical, and Capt. Brett was about to move inland.

For the first time, the Dusseldorf Airport was receiving troop planes. Capt. Billy W. Wren, another 435th TAW ALCE commander, was on the job there. The Reforger planes had parked away from the main passenger terminal in order to preserve a military "low profile." Most travelers, he was sure, were not even aware of troop activity at the airport.

Just to make certain everything went without a hitch, German Army reservist Capt. Wilfried Hausman—a federal justice of the High Court of Dusseldorf—was helping Capt. Wren as interpreter and ombudsman. The U.S. troops had been moved quickly off the airport—within minutes, really—to bivouacs near Monchengladbach, Herongen, Coesfeld, and Rheineberg.

Further to the east, Wiesbaden AB had been reactivated for Reforger, and Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve C-130s were using its runways as springboards to landing strips near where the Army readied for mock battle. A-10 tank-busters of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Tactical Air Command also were nested at Wiesbaden. They were getting plenty of practice in mock attacks against the 3,500 tanks and armored vehicles involved in Autumn Forge.

Ramstein AB, near Kaiserslautern, was the main arrival point for most of the stateside troops. The first simulated casualties were being sent back to the area. Air Force C-130s rushed them to Upper Heyford, England, and C-141B's then took the "wounded" back to military hospitals in the United States.

Everywhere in Europe the flying workload had ballooned. Maj. Ronald T. Kadish's 37th Tactical Airlift Squadron at Rhein-Main could attest to that. Aircrews had been flying into some pretty rough places for the Army. Maj. Kadish, the unit's operations officer and a pilot with 2,400 hours, said, "The workload is a lot higher now than it normally is, and that puts a strain on people. We're a 24-hour a day operation. The Reforger missions are scattered throughout the day, so we need more crews. The



schedule and workload under these conditions is more difficult even if the number of missions never changed. But," he added, "that's the way we would do it in wartime, to supply the units in the field."

As the subordinate unit of the 435th TAW, the 37th TAS was providing advanced element controllers. It is also a permanent duty unit in Europe. "And being permanent, we do this Reforger thing all the time, on a daily basis," Maj. Kadish said. "Once the C-141s from the States deliver people, we follow them in and do our type of airdrop. We do late-night drops—whatever it takes to support the Army.

"The C-141s go back to the States, sometimes without stopping in Germany. The concept is that strategic airlift brings in the people, and we supply them in an air-to-air interface. We do it on short notice, resupplying the troops with food, ammo—whatever. We get our tasking orders from the 322nd Airlift Division [MAC] and we launch within three to four hours after notification."

The Air Force in Europe had been ordered to 12-hour shifts. At Ramstein, headquarters for the 322nd Airlift Division, so many transports had



**CLOCKWISE (from above):** The welcome sign was out for Reforger participants. One of those participants uses his signalling mirror. Troops prepare to board an aircraft. Tanks move across a bridge during war games.



arrived during one period of Reforger that parking space shrank to zero. Maintenance people scampered keep up.

"We had ramp saturation at times, with every spot taken, including alternate spots out back and the hot cargo pit," said Capt. David B. Nobel, 608th Airlift Support Group. "As of today, 20 days into the month, we're already 40 planes over our normal monthly load of 200 planes. We've done five engine changes!"

Two blocks away, in a plain, small office in a Ramstein receiving warehouse, Maj. Gen. William E. Overacker was in contact with his staff on Reforger progress. As the 322nd commander, he is MAC's top general in Europe. He expected complaints about the increased workload, which was an objective of Reforger: Planners needed to learn, he explained, how their subordinates would react to the additional stress of a big exercise.

"We work our people harder and longer," he asserted. "Most of them

being close to the work makes problems seem larger than life. Maj. Gen. Overacker was watching how his people solved those problems. A computer for the first time was plotting aircraft operations. Later, the computer would kick out a chronological history that the general and his staff would use to evaluate their part in Reforger.

Jet sounds filtered into his office as he provided a perspective that transcended the grass-roots experience at Gilze-Rijen, Dusseldorf, and all the other places where Reforger was happening. If Reforger was reduced to its common denominator, he said, "It is a transportation problem of moving people from one place to another—returning people and equipment to Europe.

"These forces, once they are here, participate in a host of exercises sponsored by the armed services. MAC also helps in the deployment of fighters used in Crested Cap [the movement of U.S.-based fighter units], and it brings the Army over for

adversaries alike that we can rapidly and strategically deploy U.S. forces in Europe. The series of exercises are watched very carefully by the Eastern Bloc nations, just as we try to watch their exercises as closely as we can, to learn tactics and procedures.

"People tend to think of Reforger as the 'return of forces to Germany.' But after it's all over, they all have to go home, so it's not just the return of forces, but the re-return of forces back to the United States after the exercise is over."

Maj. Gen. Overacker said he considers Reforger a test of command-level planning "not to exceed the capability of the bases we are using.

"But when it comes to execution," he said candidly, "things can happen we can't plan for. Instead of one mission, we may need two. Instead of a plane sitting on the ground for two hours, we may find it will be on the ground eight hours because of considerations we couldn't forecast.


"So, we try to build into the plans enough flexibility so we can, in the execution stage, take care of those kinds of things. It's a test of the planner's abilities. In Reforger, we haven't exceeded our capabilities anywhere."

Maj. Robert C. St. John, the general's chief of Central Region Planning, said the challenge is "trying to work around so as not to interfere with other things while we are doing Reforger.

"We actually knew a year ago we would need additional airlift capability. We knew the number of available C-130s in Europe would not be enough to support the fall exercises, so we coordinated with Headquarters MAC to get help from the Guard and the Reserve. They're planned for as part of the exercise force package."

The Air Force, he said, plans with the Army to determine when and where airlift is needed. "We're keeping our aircrews busy, that's for sure," he said.

Back at Gilze-Rijen, the continual radio chatter was proof the flying units—both the permanent party and the augmentees on temporary duty



**A C-130 lands during the exercise.**

are working seven days a week during this period. The key word is 'surge.' We are able to surge our folks and produce good results at a highly increased rate of activity. Because of augmentation [from U.S. units] and the increased hours, we are able to do our regular mission and Reforger equally well.

"We find the exercise lets us try inexperienced people in surge operations and to hone experienced people to a fine edge," the general added.

Gilze-Rijen, Dusseldorf, and on the Ramstein maintenance ramps,

the field exercises. Reforger is just one small aspect of the Autumn Forge exercise, but it's a vital part."

Defining Reforger further, he said, "It is both political and military. In the military sense, it allows us to practice what we might one day have to do for real. It allows the Army to come to the theater where its forces would be deployed, and to the places where they might have to fight a war."

In addition, Maj. Gen. Overacker said, "Reforger demonstrates to our friends and to our potential

from the United States—were getting a workout. Capt. Brett had returned to the bunker. The Canadian C-130 had come and gone and another German C-160 with orange markings over green-gray camouflage paint was loading. The air inside the bunker was stale with cigarette smoke. Capt. Brett strolled past an Army soldier squatting in a corner and probing the cold contents of a can of C-rations.

Gilze-Rijen was important for the moment, a place from which to move the pawns of war. It had seen use before in World War II. Capt. Brett and the aircrews who flew out of it during Reforger were demonstrating it was ready for allied use again. ☛

**CLOCKWISE (from bottom): A soldier takes a short rest break. A tank and armored personnel carrier move through a small village. Armored personnel carriers share the roadways with automobiles in Stockhusen, Germany. Some 3,500 tanks and armored vehicles were used in the Autumn Forge exercise.**

